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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

GUY H. WIGHT and
FLORENCE D. WIGHT, his wife,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
vs.

Case No.
No. 10248

EUGENE CALLAGHAN and
EDNA CALLAGHAN, his wife.
Defendants-Appellants.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action by landlords under three separate and distinct leases for claimed breach of covenant in allegedly failing to restore premises to as
good condition as when entered upon.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the court. From a judgment for the plaintiffs, defendants appeal.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2
.• 1 ~

'

• '

'

'

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek reversal of the judgment
against them, arid judgment in their favor as a matter of law; or, that failing, a new trial and a decree
to the effect that Eugene Cailaghan can only be held
liable for breach, if any, of covenants contained in
the leases which he executed; that the trial court
be required to determine which items of claimed
damage, if any; arose during the time that Edna
Callaghafi; alone, was liable, and which items of
claimed damage are normal wear and tear for which
neither Defendant is liable. The trial court should be
further required to ~eliminate from the .judg~ent
those items of claimed damage for which Defe;ndants
are charged twice in the Findings and Judgment
and eliminate the judgment for loss of personal property abandoned by Plaintiffs. Appellants also seek
reversal of the order disinissirig, without trial, their
counterclaim; or, in lieu thereof, that the value of
the improvements, the subject of the counterclaim,
be offset against any sum recovered by Plaintiffs.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 18, 1957, Plaintiffs leased to Defendants, under a written lease, for a two-year term,
at $225.00 per month, an old farm house, remodelled
some 20 years previously, located at 3621 Highland
Drive, Sa1t Lake County, Utah.

bn February 25, 19'59, a new lease was made,
covering the same premises, for a one-year term
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at $175.00 a month. This lease was signed only by
Guy H. Wight as Lessor and Edna S. Callaghan as
Lessee. This lease expired February 29, 1960.
On May 10, 1960, a third lease was executed to
take effect July 1, 1960, and to expire June 30, 1963,
at $200.00 a month, rent payable for 33 months only,
though the term of the lease was 36 months. This
lease was signed by both Plaintiffs and both Defendants.
During the time Defendants were in possession,
they made certain structural improvements to property, intending to buy it. Defendants filed a Counterclaim for $4,602.35 for major improvements to
the property. On motion of Plaintiffs this was dismissed by the Court prior to trial.
Plaintiffs, during the period of occupancy by
Defendants, entered the premises from time to time
and made repairs of various natures.
Mter Defendants vacated the property in July,
1963, Plaintiffs brought this action claiming Defendants breached the covenant in the leases requiring restoration of the premises in as good condition
as when entered upon, except for reasonable wear
and tear or damage by the elements or by fire.
Upon trial, the Court found the issues in favor
of Plaintiffs and entered judgment in their favor
for $183.33 rent for July, 1963, $105.13 for items
claimed to be missing, $258.43 for items claimed to
be damaged, $10.00 for law.n seed, $775.88 for al-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4
leged damage by water from a burst pipe during the
fall_ of 1959 or winter of 1960, $26.00 for cleaning
a dirty rug, $829.54 for painting and papering and
restoring premises, $568.64 for attorney's fee, and
$65.50 costs.
Plaintiffs, in their Complaint, claimed $6.00
for unpaid sewer charges, but this claim was not
supported by evidence and no judgment was rendered
thereon.
ARGUMENT
Point I:
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT· SUPPORT A
FINDING THAT DEFENDANT, EUGENE CALLAGHAN ,WAS LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIMED
DAMAGES EXCEPT SUCH AS MAY HAVE ACCRUED BETWEEN MARCH 1, 1957, AND
MARCH 1, 1959, OR AFTER JULY 1, 1960, AND
NO DAMAGES ARE SHOWN TO HAVE OCCURRED DURING THOSE PERIODS OF TIME.
In this action, judgment was entered against
both Defendants for the entire damages claimed. The
findings do not, for the most part, establish when
the claimed damage occurred, except that it was
sometime between the commencement of the first
lease and the termination of the third. Eugene Callaghan signed the first lease and the third, but he
did not sign the second, and inasmuch as this is
an action for breach of covenants in a lease, he can
only be charged for breach of covenants, if any, in
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those contracts to which he was a party. From the
expiration of the first Jease, March 1, 1959, until
the commencement of the term under the third lease,
July 1, 1960, there was no lease in existence to which
Eugene Callaghan was a party, and it was during
this period of time that the greatest item of alleged
damage occurred. (R. 19 Par. 15.) In fact, the only
alleged damages identified as to time, occurred during this period.
At the trial, Plaintiffs endeavored to establish
that the second lease was signed by Mrs. Callaghan
as agent for her husband, but the proof submitted
does not support such claim.
At the time the three leases were offered in
evidence, counsel for Defendants objected to the admission of the second lease, Exhibit 3. To this objection, counsel for Plaintiffs stated (Tr. 44 Line 20):
It is our position it is continuing, and the
wife did have authority to sign for the husband and did sign it and the lease was fully
executed by both parties, the husband and
the wife, and that the defendant husband is
bound by his wife signing on the lease.
This statement by Plaintiffs' counsel is a desperate effort to tie both the parties to the second
lease, but unfortunately for Plaintiffs, it is not the
law. A purported agent who does not claim to be
an agent and does not purport to execute in behalf
of the principal and who does not have either real
or apparent authority does not bind the purported
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principal. Mrs. Callaghan did not purport to bind
her husband. She did not execute the lease in his behalf by herself as a purported agent. She did not
claim to have nor did she have either real or apparent
authority. She did not, therefore, bind her husband
to the second lease.
At the trial, counsel for Plaintiffs, after having made the incorrect statement of the law quoted
above, passed on without showing the claimed authority. The Court thereupon, in an apparent effort
to assist Plaintiffs' attorney (as the Court seems
to have done several times during the course of the
trial), reminded him that he had not furnished proof
of authority for Mrs. Callaghan to bind her husband.
The Court said (Tr. 45 Line 13):
Mr. Kump, on number three, if you want
to show agency so the contract would be binding on those who did not sign, I will expect
you to put in proof. The mere fact it is admitted (in evidence) does not mean it is binding on the ones who did not sign it.
To this, Mr. Kump, counsel for Plaintiffs, replied
(Tr. 45 Line 18):
I appreciate that, your honor.
Thereupon, counsel for Plaintiffs, responsive t~ the
Court's prompting, cross-examined his own client,
Dr. Wight, in an effort to prove agency. This effort
was futile. Dr. Wight explained that not only was
the matter not discussed with Mr. Callaghan, but
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he, Dr. Wight, and Mrs. Callaghan specifically
agreed that the signature of Mr. Callaghan was not
necessary. Dr. Wight testified (Tr. 45-46), that he
did not discuss the matter at all with Mr. Callaghan.
He testified :
We discussed it with Mrs. Callaghan and
she agreed she would sign the lease and I
would sign the lease and we would not send
it to Cyprus for Mr. Callaghan's signature.
Counsel tried to get Dr. Wight to say that Defendant Eugene Callaghan had confirmed the lease
by letter. This effort was also fruitless (Tr. 46).
Had there been any letter of confirmation, we may
be sure it would have been offered in evidence. Counsel then probed for payment of rent by Mr. Callaghan, but Dr. Wright testified (Tr. 46line 24):
Mrs. Callaghan always paid the rent.
It is elemental that the burden of proving agency rests on the party alleging it, and that agency is
not presumed, but is a question of law which must
be established by proven facts. (See West's Digest
System, Principal and Agent, Key 19, and numerous
cases cited therein.) Plaintiffs have not met this
burden of proof and for that reason, if for no other,
Defendants' appeal should be granted and the case
remanded for elimination of all items of damage
charged to Defendant Eugene Callaghan for purported damage occurring between the end of the first
lease and the commencement of the third.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

Point II:
PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT PROVEN THAT
CLAIMED DAMAGES OCCURRED DURING
PERIODS LEASES WERE IN EFFECT.
Any claimed damage occurring during the
period when no lease was in effect, that is, between
March 1, 1960, and June 30, 1960, as to defendant
Edna Callaghan and between March 1, 1959, and
June 30, 1960, as to Defendant Eugene Callaghan,
would not be breach of covenant in a lease, but tort.
Plaintiffs do not plead in tort, and had they done
so, their claim would have been barred by the Statute
of Limitations, this action having been filed August
27, 1963, more than three years after the alleged
tort could have occurred. Any claim in tort would
thus have been barred by the provisions of Sec. 7812-26 (1), Utah Code Annotated 1953. Consequently, any claim for damages occurring within these
time limits must be disallowed. This points up a
fatal defect in Plaintiffs' case. Except for the water
damage, which allegedly occurred during the winter
of 1959-1960 (Findings, Par. 15, R. 19), there is no
finding as to when any of the alleged damage occurred. Dr. Wight testified that he did not know
whether any of the items purported to be missing
were there when the last lease was signed (Tr. 58,
line 6; Tr. 103 line 13). The Court cannot assume
that damage occurred during the leased period. That
is a fact which Plaintiffs had the burden to prove
and failed to prove. If for no other reason, the case
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should be remanded to the trial court for a new
trial to determine what, if any, of the claimed damage occurred during the period the leases were in
effect.
Point III:
DEFENDANTS SHOULD NOT BE CHARGED WITH NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR; NOR
WITH IMPROVEMENTS BEYOND MERE RESTORATION.
By the Findings of Fact (R. 18-20) upon which
the judgment is based, the Defendants are charged
with: the expense of cleaning a dirty rug, $26.00;
the cost of replacing worn out and missing check
ropes in the garage 60¢; a missing door stop in garage, $1.50; a worn out water softener, $100.00;
paints and labor in redecoration; etc. It is Defendants' contention that the damage claimed by Plaintiffs is merely normal wear and tear that can be
expected from 6¥2 years' occupancy.
Before discussing specific items of claimed damage, let us see what the record reveals as to the status
of the property at the inception of the lease. The
home was purchased by Plaintiffs in 1937 (Tr. 40).
It had been an old farm house (Tr. 40), remodelled
before its purchase by Plaintiffs. ( Tr. 41.) They
lived in it until1954 to 1956 (Tr. 41), a period of
17 to 19 years. Then it was occupied for nine months
by an employee of the Plaintiffs ( Tr. 171), an unmarried woman (Tr. 41), who had another girlliv-
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ing with her ( Tr. 42) . The record is not clear as to
the length of time it was vacant prior to its occupancy by this employee who moved in March, 1956.
Plaintiffs testified as to different times that they
moved out; Dr. Wight said in 1953 (Tr. 104) or
1954 or 1956 (Tr. 41). His testimony does not appear to be very reliable. Defendants moved in during
February, 1957.
The nature of the home must be deduced from
little items. It had no tile, only linoleum on the kitchen drain (Tr. 95); the drawer pulls on the kitchen
cabinets were dime-store glass pulls (Tr. 57). One
of them was broken ( Tr. 339). The glass door in
the kitchen cabinet was broken (Tr. 326). The plaster was in bad shape, and "sloughed occasionally
and had done so before" on most of the walls, as testified to by the Plaintiff, Dr. Wight (Tr. 99). The
plaster had come off in one place (Tr. 299). The rug
on the living room floor had been down for 16 years
(Tr. 106 line 16 and Tr. 138), and was pitted and
stained with brown spots (Tr. 246 and 257). The
yard was overgrown (Tr. 271) and by Plaintiffs'
own admission there was debris in the yard left by
the Plaintiffs (Tr. 113 lines 6-7). The home was in
poor repair (Tr. 27 4; Tr. 250 lines 17-19; Tr. 252
lines 12-14) . Only the basement bedroom and bath
had been painted within the previous 3 or 4 years
(Tr. 118 lines 2-6). Elsewhere the paint was 16 or
17 years old (Tr. 152-153). It needed to be cleaned
and decorated (Tr. 246). The shop was a rough
workshop lined with 5 inch flooring (Tr. 119) until
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its extensive remodelling and conversion into an
office by Defendant (Tr. 120). There was a water
softener at least 2 or 3, or more likely, 8 or 9 years
old (Tr. 125). There was trouble of some undisclosed
nature in the basement, admitted by Plaintiffs, requiring "rebuilding" every 5 or 6 years ( Tr. 132) .
Obviously this was no immaculate mansion; and it
should be pointed out that most of the references
to the transcript, hereinabove referred to, are from
the testimony of the Plaintiffs themselves.
During the term of occupancy of the property
by Defendants, the Defendants paid to Plaintiffs
$15,400.00 in rents, and expended $1,560.63 in maintenance of the property (Tr. 318), not to mention
the expenditure by Defendants of $4,602.35 in making improvements and alterations to said premises
(R. 6). During this same time, Plaintiffs charged
off. $4,000.00 in depreciation on this property on
their income tax return (Tr. 107), and received
$775.88 plus $74.00 (Tr. 116-117) from .an insurance company for damages, the same damages which
are here charged to Defendants. Yet they expect to
have their cake and eat it too, by compelling Defendants to restore the property not merely to the
same, but to better condition than before their occupancy. Dr. Wight testified that he replaced the old
linoleum drainboard with tile (Tr. 95-96). The place
was completely renovated throughout, all at the expense of the Defendants. To restore it to the condition at the commencement of the tenancy would have
required merely old paint, a worn out rug, debris in
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the yard, dime store hardware and "sloughing" plaster.
·
Now, let us examine specific items. The Court
allowed Plaintiffs $200.00 for damage to the living
room rug. A spot 2 x 4 feet in front of the fireplace
was burned until the nap was gone (Tr. 50). Plaintiffs both testified that this rug was 16 years old
before Defendants moved in (Tr. 106 lines 17-18
and Tr. 138). The Plaintiffs offered in evidence a
piece of the rug, to-wit: the burned spot and the area
around it. This was not admitted in evidence, but
various witnesses were asked to testify as to the condition of the area around the burn, to show, from
this unburned portion, that the rug still had some
useful life. But, this portion of the rug had always
been covered either by a piano (Tr. 276), or, as Dr.
Wight admitted, by a Navajo rug (Tr. 413 and Tr.
423), so obviously it would not be subject to wear.
Dr. Wight himself testified that this portion of the
rug was not worn like the remainder (Tr. 427).
Elsewhere, Dr. Wight admitted, the rug showed
"considerable wear." On the stairs this same rug
(Tr. 139) had holes worn clear through (Tr. 428).
It is obvious that this rug was worn out, from
15 or 16 years of tramping over it by Plaintiff and
his family, 9 months by a tenant and 6% years by
Defendants. That rug rendered service far beyond
the usual time. An expert, Mr. Gray, testified that
the normal useful life of carpet, "of a very good
grade" is 15 years. (Tr. 228). An expert in the rental
business testified carpet only lasted 10 to 15 years
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before it became shabby and had to be replaced.
This carpet had already served its full term of usefulness before Defendants moved in. That it was
completely worn out 6% years later is only normal
wear and tear. Only a small area was burned. Yet
the trial court awarded judgment of $200.0 as to
this same rug.
Defendants are charged $100.00 for a water
softener. This, too, by Plaintiffs' admission, was old
when Defendants moved in ( Tr. 69 lines 3-4), though
Plaintiffs also claimed that it was practically brand
new ( Tr. 69 line 2). Water softeners are expendible,·and this one was worn out when the Callaghans
moved in. It broke down shortly after they moved
in (Tr. 340), at which time Dr. Wight repaired it
temporarily, but it did not last and had to be repaired repeatedly ( Tr. 340), before it was finally
abandoned as worn out.
Judgment was twice rendered against Defendants because of a claimed burn on the linoleum drainboard. This drainboard was old, cracked and deteriorated when Defendants moved in ( Tr. 340). Mrs.
Callaghan waxed and shellacked it to try and preserve it, but apparently not to the satisfaction of Dr.
Wight. He replaced it with tile, for which Defendants were charged not just once, but twice; once, for
$45.00 in Finding 13 (R. 19), and again by inclusion of the same item in the list making up the
$200.15 item in Finding 17 (R. 20). Dr. Wight so
testified (Tr. 96 lines 12-13).
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Defendants are charged for breakage of items
broken by Plaintiffs. The judgment includes $1.45,
for broken electrical outlets and switches and $10.00
for broken glass window. Mrs. Callaghan testified
(Tr. 342 and Tr. 343), that Dr. Wight himself broke
these and her testimony is nowhere controverted.
These electrical outlets and switches were also
charged to Defendants twice - once in Finding
13 ( R. 19 ) and again by inclusion in the miscellaneous figure for materials, $200.15, Finding 17 (R.
20). See Dr. Wight's testimony (Tr. 68 lines 1724). How many other items are charged twice, included in both Finding 13 and Finding 17 it is impossible to determine, because the lists, constituting
the $79.39 item and the $200.15 item were not
offered in evidence and what they included can only
be guessed at. Certain it is that some items, as shown
above, are included twice and probably all of them
are. The Plaintiff, Dr. Wight, testified (Tr. 89lines
22-25) that· the "lumped figure" included the material for ''all of the things that were done on the inside of the house.'' The case should be remanded for
clarification of Finding 17 and elimination of the
duplicate charges.
Judgment was rendered against the Defendants for $829.54 for renovation, painting and decorating (R 20). This work was done entirely by the
Plaintiffs themselves, except for $25.00 paid to a
paperhanger. Dr. Wight claimed Mrs. Wight put in
18 days cleaning and 12 days for painting and spackling (Tr. 181-182). She herself testified to only 7%
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days cleaning and that included one day spent cleaning the exterior porch and flagstones. (Tr. 146.)
She also testified that this cleaning consumed as
much time as did the painting (Tr. 145 lines 22-23).
If she spent 6% days interior cleaning and an equal
time painting, she spent far less time than her husband testified to, and her testimony should have
greater weight because he was not there all the time.
He "left her off every morning" while he went on
(Tr. 182 line 3).
What was the nature of her "cleaning?" She
said (Tr. 148), that she scrubbed and waxed the
kitchen floor four different times; that
after a certain period of work up there, I
would get down on my hands and knees and
scrub that floor and wax it again. (Tr. 148
lines 13-14.)
One cannot consider such a statement without
a mental question, "If she scubbed it clean, ready
to be waxed the first time, why do it again, and if
not yet clean, why did she wax it?" If this is typical
of her other cleaning, it is no wonder that it took her
7% days. One is led to wonder how much the Court
allowed for the second, third and fourth scrubbing
and waxing. The findings do not show this. This
standard of cleanliness is not required of a vacating
tenant. They were required only to restore as it was
before, less reasonable wear and tear.
Furthermore, Mrs. Wight testified that she
spent $300.00 worth of time during August, 1962,
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during the term of the lease (Tr. 149). The judg~
ment allowed her $225.00 (R. 20). The Findings
do not show whether this $225.00 was for services
in August, 1962, or services after defendants vacated, nor whether she was awarded judgment for
the 2nd, 3rd and 4th scrubbing and waxing or only
for the first. There is no finding as to the rate per
hour, so it cannot be determined if the rate was reasonable. If any allowance was made for time spent
in 1962, such must be disallowed. A tenant is not
liable for work done by a landlord without the tenant's request. 51 CJS 1093, Sec. 368 n 20, and cases
cited. The trial court should be required to be specific as to the items for ·which judgment was rendered
against Defendants.
There is no testimony as to what Dr. Wight
was doing all this time, except that he painted the
walls after his wife washed and spackled them and
painted the woodwork (Tr. 147lines 19-22). Assuming that he painted and redecorated throughout that is only what is customary in the rental business. It is not at all uncommon for a landlord to have
to redecorate a vacated apartment after only a few
months of occupancy, in order to find a new tenant.
Mr. Noall, a disinterested witness engaged in the
rental business, testified rental property must be
repainted every 3 to 5 years (Tr. 165). Apparently,
he felt tenants required a higher standard than Dr.
Wight who felt that painting every 20 years was
sufficient ( Tr. 125). Mrs. Wight testified that the
only time the place was repapered and repainted was
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"approximately 4 or 5 years after we bought it in
1937 (Tr. 40), so it was repainted in 1941 or 1942.
After that the only repainting, by Mrs. Wight's own
admission (Tr. 143), ·was painting the laundry and
basement. Here we have paint 15 or 16 years old
when Defendants moved in, plus 6% years' occupancy, a total of 21% to 22% years. Even by Dr~
Wight's own 20-year standard, repainting was long
past due. Mr. Wheat, a painter of long experience
(Tr. 297), who examined the premises when the
Defendants first moved in, testified that even then,
in 1957, there were
water marks on the walls, underneath the windows, the paper started peeling off, plaster
-was in evidence in a few places, and the woodwork was chipped in several places. (Tr. 298
lines 22-25.)
He did some painting then, as did Mrs. Callaghan
also (Tr. 299). Six and a half years later, Defendants are charged with complete renovation. The judgment of the Court subjects the Defendants to the
expense of restoring the property to the condition
it was in 1941 or 1942, not 1957, and no allowance
whatever is made for normal wear and tear.
Judgment was rendered against Defendants for
$26.00 for cleaning a rug in an upstairs bedroom.
One can well imagine that a rug should be cleaned
after 6% years' use, and the cost appears to be reasonable, but cleaning this rug was not Defendants'
responsibility. In normal wear and tear it is expected

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18
that rugs will get dirty. The leases (Exhibits 2, 3
and 4) specifically provided that the tenants were
to clean curtains and blankets, linens and drapes, if
furnished; but nothing is said about carpets or rugs.
If it was intended that Defendants should be required to clean the rugs, the lease should have so
provided. Itemization of specific items to be cleaned
negatives the claim that other items not mentioned
were also to be cleaned. There is no authority for
the Court to amplify the provisions of the lease to
favor the lessor. Rather the rule of law is directly
to the contrary. Corpus Juris summarizes the law
thus:
In case of doubt or uncertainty as to the
meaning of a lease, ordinarily it is to be construed most strongly against the lessor and
in favor of the lessee. (51 CJS 859 Sec. 232 1.)
The inclusion of this charge in the judgment was
error.
It is appropriate, at this point, to discuss wh_a.t
the courts have considered to be normal wear and
tear. Corpus Juris Secundum defines "wear and
tear'' as follows:
Ordinary wear and tear, excepted in a
tenants covenant to repair, includes the usual
deterioration from the use of the premises in
the lapse of time, in spite of ordinary care ~or
their preservation, but not the total or partial
destruction of the building or an appurtenance
thereof by a sudden or unexpected catastrophe.***
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In general, the ordinary reasonable use
and wear of property by a tenant within an
exception to a tenant's covenant to make good
all damages, breakage, etc., has relation to
the depreciation in the condition of building
or property which it undergoes, during the
tenant's occupation, when the tenant, in the
case of a residence, at least, does nothing in
connection with the use more than to come
and go and perform the acts usually incident
to creating and maintaining conditions for
living in the ordinary way. (51 CJS 1102.)
Except for the loss caused by the freezing of
the pipes, and a fire loss, both of which will be discussed later, Plaintiffs have shown no sudden or
unexpected catastrophe. The property received the
ordinary care for its preservation required under
the law, as defined by C.J.S., supra. The expenditure of $1,560.63 by tenants for maintenance of the
property during the term of the tenancy (Tr. 318)
testifies to that fact. Plaintiffs have not shown any
unusual acts by Defendants. As a matter of fact,
Defendants hoped to buy the place, until just the
last few months of tenancy, so they certainly would
do nothing to destroy it.
But property does depreciate with the passage
of time. Dirt accumulates, paint deteriorates, some
breakage occurs in normal use and fixtures wear
out. The law recognizes this depreciation and allowance is made for it in the income tax laws. This depreciation allowance is intended roughly to equal
the normal wear and tear. Plaintiffs put their own
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estimate of this wear and tear at $650.00 to $800.00
per year. (Tr. 107.) Simple arithmetic produces a
depreciation figure of $4,225.00 to $5,200.00 for the
6% years' term. Their total cost for restoration of
the property to far better condition than it was at
the commencement of the term, was substantially
less than what they claimed on their income tax return as normal depreciation.
If the need for cleaning, repapering and repainting is not a result of normal wear and tear,
it is hard to conceive what those words would include.
The courts have held that repapering and refinishing are not the responsibility of the tenant, even under a covenant to keep in repair. It was held in Smith
vs. Maxfield, 9 Misc. 42, 29 NY Supp. 63, that
A covenant to repair and make good any
damage occurring through neglect of the tenant, does not obligate him to restore the premises, upon the termination of the lease, to a
condition better than they were in at the commencement thereof.*** Tenant was not bound
to make extensive renovations and was not
liable to pay the landlord for making the same
at the termination of the lease, where they
consisted of re-papering and refinishing the
woodwork. (Emphasis added.)
Except for the ordinary wear and tear incident
to 6% years' occupancy, there are only two major
items of damage - the damage from the freezing
of the water pipe (Finding 15, R. 19) and the burning of the rug (Finding 10, R. 18). Plaintiffs were
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reimbursed for these losses by insurance (Tr. 116117), but judgment for them was also rendered
against the Defendants. Defendants do not claim
that they were entitled to the insurance proceeds,
but they do contend that they were not liable, under
the terms of the leases, for these items of damage.
The lease specifically exempts the Defendants from
liability for:
reasonable wear and tear or damage by the
elements or by fire. (Exhibits 2, 3 and 4.)
It is because such exceptions are customary in
leases that landlords customarily protect themselves
by insurance, as Plaintiffs did here.
It was error for the Court to charge Defendants
with the fire damage, regardless of whether any
negligence is traceable to the Defendants. The rule
of law is set forth in Vol. 1, American Law of Property, page 350, sec. 3. 79, n 10 as follows:
An exception of damage by fire includes
damage caused by lessee's negligence.
In support thereof, American Law of Property
cites General Mills vs. Goldman, 184 F 359 (C.C.A.
8th 1950); Slocum vs. Natural Products Company,
292 Mass. 455, 198 NE 747; Brewer "An Inductive
Approach to the Liability of the Tenant for Negligence," 31 B.U.L. Rev. 47 (1951) I L. Rev. Dig. 17.
The same rule applies to the damage from the
freezing and bursting of the water pipes. Damage
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by the elements "includes all injury by wind, rain,
snow, frosts and heat, as well as ordinary decay
from natural causes." (Emphasis added.) Edwards
vs. Ollen Restaurant Corp. ( 1950) 198 Misc. 853
98 NYS. 22· 815.
'
To the same effect is Corpus Juris Secundum:
Ordinary wear and tear and damage by
the elements, excepted from the lessee's covenant to repair, covers repairs made necessary
by water, which from freezing or otherwise,
has caused outer portions of the building to
be out of repair. (51 CJS 1102 n 33.)
CJS cites in support Mills ·vs. U. S. 52 Ct. Cl. 452.
The premises, as a whole, were in very much
better condition when Defendants vacated than when
they took possession. It is not disputed that the Defendants, with the approval of Plaintiffs, expended
a very substantial sum in increasing the size of the
living room, adding a room in the attic, installing a
gable window and converting a workshed into an
office. To charge Defendants with every conceivable
item of damage, down to a 60¢ rope, but deny them
any consideration for the $4,602.35 claimed by them
to have been expended in improvements (R. 6), constitutes unjust enrichment to the Plaintiffs to such
an extent that it shocks the conscience. Defendants
contend that the Court erred in dismissing Defendants' Counterclaim- but even if the value of these
improvements was not available as a counterclaim,
their value, as contributing to the over-all condition
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of the premises, should have been considered by the
Court as a set-off. Because of this over-all improvement of the property to a much better condition at
the end of the leased term than at the beginning, the
judgment should be reversed and the action dismissed.
Point IV:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING
TESTIMONY OF SUBSEQUENT ORAL REVISION OR AMENDMENT OF WRITTEN CONTRACT.
In the course of the trial, the Defendants attempted to prove, from the statement of Plaintiff,
that there had been a verbal variance of the terms
of the lease pertaining to repairs. During the direct
testimony of Defendant, Edna Callaghan, her counsel, after questioning her as to variance by Plaintiff
during the first lease, then started to question her
as to agreements by Plaintiffs during the term of
subsequent leases. He said ( Tr. 317 line 10) :
You do not recall any discussio11 with regard to cleaning and decorating by Dr. Wight
after ...
at which point he was interrupted by the Court with
the words,
I do not know it is important, no consideration for it. He either had a duty or he
didn't. What he said didn't make much difference.
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It is entirely legal for parties verbally to waive
requirements of a written agreement, and a lease
requiring a tenant to make all repairs is not binding
where there was a subquent separate agreement by
the landlord to make repairs himself.
In 51 CJS 1089, n. 54, the rule is stated:
A provision in a lease as to who shall
make repairs does not prevent parties from
entering into a new and binding agreement
governing the matter.
In support thereof, CJS cites Zimmerman vs.
Home Building and Loan Association, 170 A 703,
111 Pa Super 345.
Lease provision requiring tenant to make
all repairs is not binding where there was subsequent separate agreement by landlord to
repair ceiling.
Defendants' testimony on this point was erroneously excluded.
Point V:
PLAINTIFFS WAIVED AND ARE THEREBY ESTOPPED TO CLAIM DAMAGES OCCURRING PRIOR TO EXECUTION OF THE THIRD
AND LAST LEASE:
Plaintiffs, knowing full well the condition of
the property at the termination of the second lease,
had a duty at that time to complain to Defendants
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about the condition of the premises if they were not
satisfied therewith, and by going ahead with the execution of the third lease, they waived any claim for
prior damages and estopped themselves from thereafter complaining of or seeking damages for what
theretofore might have occurred.
Defendants, in asserting that Plaintiffs knew
the condition of the premises, are mindful of the fact
that the Court found that Plaintiffs were not aware
of the missing items and damaged items prior to the
termination of the tenancy June 30, 1963 (P.22 of
Findings, R. 20) ; but this finding is directly contrary to the evidence. It appears from the evidence
that Dr. Wight was frequently in and about the
premises. The water damage was discovered by Dr.
Wight in March 1960, after the execution of the second lease and prior to execution of the third, and
part of the damage, the dining room ceiling, was repaired by him at that time ( Tr. 54). In the fall of
1959, he was there turning off the water· and the
sprinkler system ( Tr. 121 ) , and he had to go inside
to do it. As a matter of fact, Mr. Van Tassell testified that Dr. Wight had a key (Tr. 20, line 8), though
Dr. Wight denied it (Tr. 187). Yet it is obvious from
the testimony that he went and came at will, often
without even announcing his presence (Tr. 395, see
also Tr. 188). Mrs. Callaghan testified he was there
very often, in fact every day, some of the time. (Tr.
313). Dr. Wight himself testified that he had been
there, "a great many times" ( Tr. 188 line 8). He
was there when the doorway was cut in the attic
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and pointed out the place to be cut (Tr. 71). In the
face of the admissions by Dr. Wight, that he was
there "a great many times," it was error for the
Court to find that he was not fully aware of the condition of the premises; and, if he was aware of the
condition, then if he objected thereto he had a duty
to say so. Yet he made no complaint (Tr. 314), and
let Defendants enter into a third lease believing that
all was well. He thereby waived any right thereafter
to complain and is estopped to assert a claim for damages.
Point VI:
DEFENDANTS CANNOT BE CHARGED
WITH THE LOSS OF PERSONAL PROPERTY
CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN LEFT BY PLAINTIFFS ON LEASED PREMISES.
The Court a warded damages against Defendants for $35.00 for loss of a saddle blanket, $4.50
for a bird bath, and $2.00 for a sprinkler claimed to
have been left in the garage (Tr. ·47 line 27). These
items are all personal property. The premises were
rented unfurnished by the express terms of the first
lease ( Exhibit 2 ) . This lease states :
It is provided that Lessors shall remove
the contents of all buildings.
The evidence that these items were on the premises
when Defendants took possession is very weak. Allen
Rydman, a young man who worked in the yard in
1956 and was a witness for Plaintiffs, testified that
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the bird bath was there the previous autumri (Tr.
436), but did not testify that it was there when Defendants took possessio-n. Defendants testified that
none of these items were there when they moved in.
But suppose these items were on the premises
when De!eridarits took possession. They had no responsibility toward them! In view of the provisions
of the lease requiring removal of all property, Defendants would be justified in considering anything
left behind as abandoned by Plaintiffs as worthless.
It is well settled that personal property
may be abandoned and ownership of it thereby lost. (I CJS 13, Note 5.)
Not only did Defendants owe no duty to Plaintiffs as to this personal property inasmuch as all
personal property was specifically excluded from the
pro~sioils o£ the le\ase, but the loss thereof, if wrongfully caused by Defendants, would not be a breach
of covenant in a iease, but a tort. None of the leases
included any personal property. Plaintiffs have not
pleaded tort. They did not claim tort in their pleadings and any judgment based on tort would be beyond the scope of the pleadings and void.
Point VII:
FINDING 9 IS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE. JULY 1963 RENT WAS NOT OWED TO

PLAINTIFFS.
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In Finding 9 (R. 18) the Court found that when
Defendants vacated the property, July 31, 1964, they
owed $183.33 to the Plaintiffs, and judgment is
rendered against Defendants including this amount
( R. 22). The date in the finding is wrong, but this
is immaterial. What is material is the finding that
Defendants owed $183.33 to Plaintiffs.
Exhibit 1, admitted in evidence was a signed
agreement dated July 10, 1963, providing for sale
of the property by Plaintiffs to Glen Lane Van .Tassell, to take effect July 1, 1963. In pursuance of this
contract, an escrow was executed by sellers and buyers and by the Valley State Bank, escrow holder
(Exhibit 9). The contract (Exhibit 1), and the Escrow (Exhibit 9) were in full force and effect until
August 10, 1963, and were then terminated by a
Mutual Agreement (Exhibit 10). Dr. Wight admitted (Tr. 110-111) that this agreement (Exhibit
1) was to take effect upon termination of Defendants' lease. The lease terminated on June 30, 1963.
The contract of sale took effect, July 1, 1963. The
rent for July came due on the same date. By reason
of the contract of sale, Van Tassell was entitled to
the rent for July. At this point, there was no further
privity of agreement between Plaintiffs and Defendants, after termination of the lease and after the
contract of sale went into effect. The later mutual
release of the contract of sale would not transfer
to Plaintiffs any obligation that had arisen in the
meantime, without an express assignment from Van
Tassell to Plaintiffs. There is no transfer from Van
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Tassell to Plaintiffs of this right of the July rent,
and the· inclusion of this item in. the judgment was
error.
Point VIII:
PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO A
JUDGMENT FOR COSTS, NOT HAVING FILED
A MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AS REQUIRED
BY RULE 54 (d) (2), RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
There is included in the Findings ( R. 20) , and
by the Judgment ( R. 22) , $65.50 for costs. There is
nothing in the record to substantiate this judgment.
Defendants have no way of knowing what items
made up this total. The Plaintiffs did not file the
Memorandum of Costs required by Rule 54 (d) (2),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and this item should
be stricken from the judgment.
CONCLUSION
The judgment awarded to Plaintiffs by the trial
court is, according to the Findings of Fact, composed
of the following items:
(a) Rent claimed to be due for July, 1963,
(b) Damage to rug by fire and damage caused
by frozen water line,
(c) Cleaning, papering, painting, replacement
of broken or missing items, including abandoned
personal property,
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(d) Attorney's f~~s and costs.
It is the sincere contention of Defendants that
none of these items are properly charged against
Defendants.
·,
(a) The rent f~r July, 1963, was not payable
to flain~iffs. There was, at that time, no privity
of agreement
between Plaintiffs and Defendants'
.
anp Plaintiffs showed no assignment or transfer
to th~m 9f.thi~ ~ho~~ in actipn
·
'

'

'

.

(b) The damage by fire and by freezing was
a ris~ assumed py Plaintiffs as lessors, by the expr.ess terms of the lease~. To protect against thi~,
they ca:rrie9, insurance which fully compensated them
for the loss. :aut even if they had had no insurance,
no liability would attach to the Defendants pecause
of the e~press terms of th~ lease relieving Defendants from liability for damage by fire and the elements.
(c) The miscellaneous claims of Plaintiff are
either for items of personal property, claimed by
Plaintiffs to have been left 9n the property, and as
to which Defendants had no responsibility,' or item~
of normal Wear and tear, as dis(!ussed in Point II~
above. Defendants are not liable for loss of personal
property nor for norn1al wear and tear.
(d) Defendants, not being liable for the other
items of claimed damage, are not liable for attorney's fees nor for costs, and the decision o~ t~~ district court should be reversed, and the case remanded
with instructions to dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint.
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Defendants also, at this time, again point out.
to the Court their additional contentions:
First: That no judgment can be granted against
Defendant, Eugene Callaghan for alleged breach of
covenants in a lease to which he was not a party.
Second: That Defendants can be held liable for
breaches of covenants only when the alleged breaches
occurred during periods when leases were in effect,
and this Plaintiffs have failed to show.
Third: The judgment, as rendered, charges Defendants twice for many items of claimed damage,
and for items of damage contained on lists not in
evidence, the contents of which were not disclosed.
Fourth : The Court erred in excluding testimony
vital to Defendants' case.
Fifth: Plaintiffs, by leading Defendants into
execution of the third and last lease, without objecting to any claimed damage occurring prior thereto,
waived any claim they might have had for alleged
damages theretofore committed, and are estopped
to claim damage for breach of covenants on any
leases except the last.
Sixth: Defendants, at their own expense, made
valuable and permanent improvements to Plaintiffs'
property, and the value of these improvements should
be offset against any sum that might be awarded
to the Plaintiffs.
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In the event the Court does not completely reverse the decision of the lower court and order dismissal of Plaintiffs' Complaint, then upon the basis
of any of Defendants' other contentions as set forth
in the six preceding paragraphs, the case should be
remanded to the lower court for a new trial, with
instructions to eliminate: the rent for July, damage
from fire and freezing, normal wear and tear, duplications, and, as to Defendant Eugene Callaghan,
all items of claimed damage which arose during the
time when no lease executed by him was in effect;
and if the Court finds a waiver or an estoppel, that
all items of claimed damage prior to the execution
of the last lease, be likewise eliminated.
Respectfully submitted,

DAN T. MOYLE
810 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
JENSEN, JENSEN &
BRADFORD
900 Walker Bank
Building
Salt Lake City 11, Utah
Attorneys for
Appellants
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